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As demand and consumption of natural gas increases, so will drilling 
operations to extract the natural gas on federal public lands.  Fueled by 
the shale gas revolution, natural gas drilling operations are now 
frequently taking place, not only in the highly documented urban settings, 
but also on federal public lands with high conservation value. The 
phenomenon of increased drilling in sensitive locations, both urban and 
remote, has sparked increased public opposition, requiring oil and gas 
producers to reconsider how they engage the public. Oil and gas 
producers have increasingly deployed the concept of a social license to 
operate to gain support from the public and the communities in which they 
operate. A social license to operate is a voluntary license granted by 
communities, obligating companies to go above and beyond the 
requirements of their legal license to operate. While natural gas 
developers have increasingly sought to achieve a social license to operate 
in urban settings, such as the Colorado Front Range, there has been little 
use of this approach by operators drilling on federal public land. We 
advocate for the use of increased collaboration with affected stakeholders 
and communities through the NEPA process as a means to achieve a social 
license to operate on federal public land.   
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“The broadest paradox of the fracking debate lies in the allocation of 
costs and benefits. The local communities in proximity to the 
development experience the disturbances with immediacy and intensity.  
The principal benefits - national security, a cleaner-burning fossil fuel, 
heated homes, generated electricity, and profits to company owners and 
stockholders - are received in distant locals. This is an arrangement set 
up to maximize distrust and misunderstanding.”1 
 
 
 
                                                 
1. Patty Limerick, The Fractured Terrain of Oil and Gas Opposition, 
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 22, 2016 (hereinafter “The Fractured Terrain”). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2013 the authors conducted a study in Routt and Moffat 
Counties in northern Colorado at the request of the Shell Exploration and 
Production Company (Shell) to explore local stakeholder perceptions 
regarding oil and gas development.2  The study involved interviews with 
representatives from various stakeholder groups, providing quantitative 
and qualitative data to explore the themes in the community discourse 
surrounding energy production in the region.3  We found five themes that 
defined the discourse, and not surprisingly, they ranged from very trusting 
to very distrusting of oil and gas companies and regulators.4  An important 
finding was that study participants were able to articulate a set of 
environmental, economic, and social conditions under which they would 
accept expanded oil and gas development in the area.5 
This study illuminated the place-based aspirations and concerns 
that would have been raised if Shell had decided to expand its oil and gas 
operations in the area (which it did not).  It also appeared that most 
conditions articulated by stakeholders were negotiable for Shell, and that 
most stakeholders were willing to negotiate with Shell.6  Had Shell 
continued with its proposed development, there would have been potential 
to use place-based collaborative approaches to optimize profits for the 
company while creating a social license to operate with the stakeholders 
and communities.  A social license to operate is society’s or a local 
community’s acceptance or approval of a company's activities or 
operations.7 
                                                 
2. Jessica M. Clement & Elizabeth Spaulding, The Prevailing Themes 
in the Oil and Gas Development Discourse Among Local Residents in Moffat and 
Routt Counties, Colorado, 1 (2013), on file with Ruckelshaus Institute, University of 
Wyoming.  
3. Id.  
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. Brian F. Yates & Celesa L. Horvath, Social License to Operate: 
How to Get it, and How to Keep it 1, Pacific Energy Summit (Summit Working Papers, 
2013), available at: http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/eta/PES_2013_summitpaper 
_Yates_Horvath.pdf. 
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When Shell sold its interests in the area, the authors continued to 
explore the extent to which collaborative approaches are used in oil and 
gas development in general, and in the United States specifically.  We met 
with executives at Shell and the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) to discuss 
collaboration and a social license to operate.  We also convened an Energy 
and Collaboration Summit, where we invited a panel of current and former 
energy executives to Jackson, Wyoming for a facilitated discussion on 
current practices and challenges related to collaborative decision making.8  
During the discussion, we explored opportunities for new approaches to 
enhancing the achievement of a social license to operate in the energy 
sector in the western United States, particularly on public lands.9  
The Shell study, the discussions with Shell and IPIECA, and the 
Energy and Collaboration Summit helped us understand that there are 
incentives and disincentives for companies to engage and collaborate with 
stakeholders and communities in order to seek a social license to operate.  
In the context of public lands, many of those incentives and disincentives 
are built into the federal regulatory process, and specifically into the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.  Given that a typical 
oil and gas NEPA Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) takes an average 
of 4.4 years to complete, there has been understandable frustration with 
the time and expense of NEPA compliance, leading to calls for NEPA 
reform and/or streamlining the process.10  However, if a streamlined 
process results in litigation and a supplemental EIS is judicially ordered, 
an additional average of 2.3 years is added to the EIS completion timeline, 
adding additional expense and frustration.11  If the NEPA process is 
streamlined, collaborative approaches to NEPA will be necessary to 
reduce the likelihood of litigation-driven EIS delay.12  
While the previous literature on the emergence of a social license 
to operate in the United States has focused on private oil and gas 
                                                 
8. Energy & Collaboration Summit, Jackson, Wyoming, (Mar. 6, 
2014) (unpublished conference report; on file with the author). 
9. Id.   
10. John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA - Substantive Effectiveness 
Under a Procedural Mandate: Assessment of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain West, 
7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 39, 45 (2016).  
11. Id.  
12. Id.  
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developments, we are particularly interested in its application to federal 
public land oil and gas development projects as a means to reduce conflict 
and add value to all parties.  In this article, we propose that NEPA provides 
a unique opportunity to incorporate greater collaboration into oil and gas 
projects in order to achieve a social license to operate.  That unique 
opportunity exists because unlike development on private land, complying 
with NEPA requirements for oil and gas production on public lands 
provides companies with a defined structure from which to engage 
communities and stakeholders through a collaborative process.  We begin 
in Section II by providing an overview of social license to operate 
including the emergence of its application in the U.S. oil and gas sector by 
discussing two case studies.  In Section III we discuss how collaborative 
processes are synonymous with social license “ingredients.”  In Section 
IV we discuss NEPA and how greater collaborative efforts can be 
incorporated into the NEPA process to achieve a social license.  In Section 
V we discuss how to overcome barriers to collaboration in the NEPA 
process, specifically overcoming the hurdles posed by the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act.  In Section VI we conclude by suggesting that 
by encouraging federal land agency personnel to incorporate more 
collaboration into the NEPA process, a variety of federal land project 
proponents (including coal, renewable, and timber) can leverage the legal 
license process to achieve a social license to operate.  
 
II.  SOCIAL LICENSE BACKGROUND 
 
As noted above, a social license to operate generally confers 
community acceptance of a company’s operations and outlines “the 
demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from 
neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other 
elements of the surrounding civil society.”13  A social license to operate is 
generally voluntary, often informal, and is granted by a community based 
on the opinions and views of stakeholders.  
                                                 
13. Neil Gunningham, et. al., Social License and Environmental 
Protection: Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 
308 (2004), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/675/. 
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The term social license was first used during a 1997 World Bank 
meeting by Jim Cooney, a Canadian mining executive, who described the 
ability of communities to stop a mining project.14  The term was revisited 
and further developed in response to the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2006, requiring extractive industries 
operating in the territories of indigenous people to secure free, prior, and 
informed consent (FPIC) from those indigenous communities.15   
While originally only applied in the mining sector, a social license 
to operate has begun to be applied to other energy sectors as well.  A social 
license is a particularly powerful tool in the energy sector where it can be 
used as leverage against the demands of environmental advocacy groups, 
who act as watchdogs and de facto regulators.16  A few damaging 
encounters involving large energy corporations, environmental advocacy 
groups, and the public has “led to a broader corporate rethink” and more 
frequent application of a social license to operate in the energy sector.17  
One such damaging encounter was Shell’s mid-1990’s miscalculation that 
the public would not object to the sinking of the Brent Spar, a 14,500 ton 
oil platform in the North Sea, because the necessary approvals from the 
UK government had been obtained.18  Much to Shell’s surprise, public 
opposition was significant, and protests against Shell were waged across 
Europe.19  Shell’s international reputation was substantially damaged and 
                                                 
14. Joel Gehman, Lianne M. Lefsrud, & Stewart Fast, Social License 
to Operate: Legitimacy by Another Name? 60 NEW FRONTIERS, 293, 294 (2017) 
(explaining that usage of the term social license to operate became widespread 
throughout the mining industry in 2002 but offering that the term is not a new concept 
and has long been understood “to play a vital function in society whereby social norms 
can precede and superseded legal rules.”). Jim Cooney, Reflections on the 20th 
Anniversary of the Term ‘Social License,’ 35 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L.197 (2017) 
(offering his personal account of how his use of ‘social license” occurred at the 1997 
World Bank meeting). 
15. Kathleen M. Wilburn & Ralph Wilburn, Achieving Social License 
to Operate Using Stakeholder Theory, 4 J. OF INT’L BUS. ETHICS, 3, 4 (2011).   
16. Gunningham, supra note 13, at 337.  
17. Id. at 309. 
18. Id.  
19. Jesper Grolin, Corporate Legitimacy in Risk Society: The Case of 
Brent Spar, 7 BUS. STRATEGY AND THE ENV’T, 213, 214 (1998).  
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its sales were significantly impacted.20  In the end, Shell decided to 
dismantle and recycle the Brent Spar platform on land.21  Had a greater 
community outreach been undertaken, and a social license obtained in 
addition to governmental approval, perhaps Shell would not have taken 
such a hard hit.  
In his book, The Social License: How to Keep your Organization 
Legitimate, John Morrison notes that fifty years ago  
 
the resource [extraction] sector secured its license to 
operate at the discretion of the government, in fact, we 
still do.  And that’s called a legal license and permits and 
license are granted and we live up to the expectation and 
they are maintained.  But in the world of globalization and 
in an increasing world of scrutiny and mobilization of 
local voices, if you don't have the broad-based support of 
local people for what you want to do, then you won’t get 
your legal license.22  
 
Understanding that negative community impacts can “damage a 
company’s reputation, or result in loss of operation time and profits, and 
can put future investment opportunities at risk” major oil and gas 
extraction companies and their investors are increasingly recognizing that 
securing a social license to operate is a precondition to development.”23 
The process of obtaining a social license includes early and 
ongoing communication with communities, transparency and engagement 
in decision-making, and the establishment of effective conflict resolution 
mechanisms.24  At its core, a social license to operate involves a significant 
                                                 
20. Id.   
21. Id. at 215.  
22. JOHN MORRISON, THE SOCIAL LICENSE: HOW TO KEEP YOUR 
ORGANIZATION LEGITIMATE, 159 (2014).  
23. Emma Wilson, What is the Social License to Operate? Local 
Perceptions of Oil and Gas Projects in Russia’s Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island, 
3 THE EXTRACTIVE INDUS. AND SOC’Y, 73, 73 (2016).  
24. Don C. Smith, Jessica Richards, & R.J. Colwell, Where “Shale” 
We Go From Here: Opportunities and Challenges in Shale Plays Located Outside the 
United States, 14-2 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FDN. 14, 14-4 (2017) referencing Jason Prno 
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degree of meaningful dialogue between a company and the community in 
the planning and operation of the industrial activity.  In that vein, a grant 
of a social license to operate by the public requires that the public 
understand what it is granting.25  Complete and accurate public disclosure 
of the relevant information needed to fully evaluate the proposed 
development must be disclosed to the public so they can gain a shared 
understanding of the risks and benefits of the energy development project.  
That disclosure should include conversations about what is known, and 
what is not known, utilizing credible, sciences-based background 
information to inform the debate so that all sides can engage in a 
discussion based on facts, not opinions.26  
Once obtained, a social license is dynamic; its grant is 
impermanent and can be revoked when public perceptions and opinions 
change.27  Pierre Lassonde, one of the most famous gold investors in the 
world, remarked during a speech to the Melbourne Mining Club in 2003, 
that a “social license to operate, much like a reputation, is first and 
foremost built on trust, which takes years to build, but can be lost in 
seconds.”28  A social license is most commonly revoked based on 
“perceived risk or lack of benefits to stakeholders.”29 
 
A. A Social License to Operate vs. a Legal License to Operate 
 
A social license to operate is not a legal license to operate, as it is 
not based on legal requirements, but rather on the degree to which a 
                                                 
& D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the Origins of “Social License to Operate” in the 
Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories, 37 RES. 
POL’Y 346, 347 (2012).  
25. Evan House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for 
Unconventional Oil and Gas, 13 WYO. L. REV. 5, 54 (2013). 
26. Id.   
27. Id. at 51.  
28. Pierre Lassonde, What Shade of Green are You?, Melbourne 
Mining Club, 5 (Aug. 8, 2003) available at: http://www.melbourneminingclub.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ Pierre-Lassonde-8-August-2003.pdf 
29. Elizabeth Holly & Clark Mitcham, The Pebble Mine Dialogue: A 
Case Study in Public Engagement and the Social License to Operate, 47 RES. POL’Y, 
18 (2016) (citing R.G. Boutilier, Frequently Asked Questions About the Social License 
to Operate, 32 Impact Assess. Proj. Apprais, 263-272 (2014)). 
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company and its activities meet the expectations of local communities, the 
wider society, and various constituent groups.30  A legal license to operate 
on the other hand, is granted by a government body and includes the initial 
permission to do something, as well as ongoing compliance with existing 
applicable laws and regulations.31  However, a legal license to operate and 
a social license to operate are not completely distinct; instead, they 
necessarily complement and reinforce one another.32  However, a legal 
license framework must necessarily exist before a social license can be 
contemplated because a social license is an extension of a legal license.33  
As applied to the oil and gas industry, the legal license sets the 
formal framework for the energy company to obtain the right to use the 
land and/or extract the natural resources in exchange for compliance with 
environmental rules and regulations.34  To the extent that the legal license 
does not encapsulate society’s expectations, in places where exploration 
and production activities are controversial and disputed, oil and gas 
companies need to rely upon a social license to operate.  In this context, a 
social license “describes the latitudes or freedom that society allows the 
business to use land and its resources without interference. Society expects 
more of businesses than that they just comply with the law.”35 
Traditionally, corporations viewed compliance with governmental 
legislation as fulfilling both their legal requirements and their social 
obligations since governmental legislation was understood to be a measure 
of societal expectations.36  Corporations were expected to go above and 
beyond compliance with legislation only if there was some financial self-
                                                 
30. Gunningham, supra note 13, at 308.  
31. Smith, Richards, & Colwell, supra note 24, at 14-3.  
32. Id. at 14-2.  
33. Id. at 14-4.  
34. Brian J. Preston, The Adequacy of the Law in Satisfying Society’s 
Expectations for Major Projects, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE PAPER, 2 (Oct. 22, 2014).  
35. Id.  
36. Gunningham, supra note 13, at 308 (citing M. Wright, Factors 
Motivating Proactive Health and Safety Management, Contract Research Report 
prepared by Entec. U.K. Ltd. For the Health and Safety Executive London, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office (1998)).   
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interest for doing so.37  That has changed.  Today, corporations understand 
that social obligations are no longer synonymous with legal obligations.38  
Instead, corporations now understand that hazards and harms that are not 
per se illegal today, may become so in the future leaving them open to both 
social and legal liability.39 
In reality, the demands by social licensors may be tougher than 
the demands imposed by legal license regulators.40  Many companies fear 
enforcement for noncompliance with a legal license not for the penalty 
associated with it, but because enforcement actions generate negative 
publicity, impacting the company’s reputation and perhaps its social 
license.41  It is also likely that failure to satisfy a social concern or establish 
a social license may result in tighter regulatory restrictions.42  
There are, however, limits on how far beyond compliance with a 
legal license companies are willing to go to satisfy a social license to 
operate.43  Constraints or limits on the social license to operate include 
economic constraints, the reasonableness of the social licensors’ demands, 
and the responsiveness of legal and political actors to enforce the social 
licensors’ demands.44  Ultimately, the impact on a company’s economic 
bottom line is the key factor in determining how far beyond legal 
compliance a company will be willing to go.45 
 
 
 
                                                 
37. Id. As an example, Gunningham noted that in the case of 
environmental protection, it was often more cost effective to reduce waste so 
corporations did so. However, over time the environment continued to be degraded so 
it was obvious the financial self-interest for reducing waste was not prevalent enough, 
thus there was a political demand for increased governmental regulation (legal 
coercion) to compel corporate environmental measures.  
38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Smith, Richards, & Colwell, supra note 24, at 14-3 to 14-4.  
41. Id. at 14-4.  
42. Gunningham, supra note 13, at 331.  
43. Id. at 332.  
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 336.  
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B. The Emergence of Social License Application in the United States Oil 
and Natural Gas Sector; Two Case Studies 
 
While first applied in the oil and gas industry in the 20th century 
in the developing world, the developed world did not apply social license 
to operate until the 2010’s, coinciding with the advent of unconventional 
oil and gas development.46  Sparked by drilling technology advances, 
unconventional gas development, or the “shale gas revolution,” has 
resulted in a dramatic increase in natural gas production in the United 
States.47  New drilling and extraction technologies have enabled drilling 
operations to occur in more sensitive locations such as urban areas and on 
public lands with high conservation value.48  Drilling in sensitive locations 
has sparked public and community opposition requiring natural gas 
developers to reconsider how they engage the public.49  On this point, Alex 
Hohmann, a former manager of stakeholder relations for Anadarko has 
commented that the major reason fuel projects go undeveloped “is not for 
lack of a legal license, but for lack of growing, earning and maintaining a 
social license.”50  
Despite its emergence, the adoption of social license practices has 
been slow to catch on in the natural gas context, resulting in limited 
examples to draw from, particularly in the federal public land context.51  
We have selected two case studies to highlight the emerging application 
of a social license to operate in the U.S. oil and gas sector.  The first case 
                                                 
46. Don C. Smith & Jessica M. Richards, Social License to Operate: 
Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry, 1 OIL & 
GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J., 91, 97 (2015). 
47.  Monika Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive 
Response to Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing 
in the United States, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 423, 425 (2014).   
48. See Aldo Svaldi, Drilling and Development are on a Collision 
Course in Northeastern Colorado, The Denver Post, Aug. 7, 2017; Brittany Patterson, 
Can Zinke Squeeze More Oil From Public Lands?, E&E News, July, 7 2017.   
49. Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 84.  
50. Id. at 117 (citing interview by Stephanie Joyce with Alex 
Hohmann, Stakeholder Relations Manager for Anadarko Petroleum, In Relationships 
101: Oil and Gas Looks for a Social License to Operate, WYOMING PUBLIC 
RADIO (Dec. 5, 2014), available at https://insideenergy.org/2014/12/05/ 
relationships-101-oil-and-gas-look-for-a-social-license-to-operate/.)  
51. Id. at 102.  
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study involves the utilization of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) 
to achieve a social license to address the deep tension involving the 
expansion of shale development on private land in and around expanding 
suburban development on Colorado's Front Range.  The second case study 
involves the utilization of a formal negotiation process, as well as a 
bilateral private negotiation process, to achieve a social license to operate 
and develop a natural gas field on sensitive federal public lands in the Nine 
Mile Canyon-West Tavaputs Plateau area in Utah.  
From the case studies we can draw two conclusions: (1) there 
exists an opportunity to add value to all parties when a social license to 
operate is achieved; and (2) while there appeared to be elements of 
cooperation among the parties in both case studies, the utilization of a 
purposive, principled collaborative process presents an opportunity to 
develop an even stronger social license to operate.  
 
C. Urban Private Land Case Study –Shale Gas Development on the 
Colorado Front Range 
 
Oil and gas development is not new to Colorado’s Front Range, 
in fact, even the progressive community of Boulder, Colorado had an 
active oil field in its midst in the early 20th century.52  While oil and gas 
development has existed on the Front Range since the 1900s, the fracking 
boom of the 2000s brought oil and gas development into the backyards of 
simultaneously expanding Front Range communities and suburbs.53  As a 
result, Colorado has found itself front and center in the public debate over 
regulation of hydraulic fracturing.54  Patty Limerick, University of 
Colorado history professor and director of the Center for the American 
                                                 
52. Patty Limerick, The Fractured Terrain of Oil and Gas Opposition, 
High Country News, Feb. 22, 2016); See also Lucas Satterlee, Clearing the Fog: A 
Historical Analysis of Environmental and Energy Law in Colorado, 28 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 11 (2017) (describing the early energy production efforts in Colorado including 
a coal mine that began operations near Boulder, CO in 1859).  
53. Austin Shaffer, Skylar Zillox, & Jessica Smith, Memorandum of 
Understanding And the Social License to Operate in Colorado’s Unconventional 
Energy Industry: A Study of Citizen Complaints, 35 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. L., 69, 69-
70 (2016).  
54. Id. at 70.  
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West, captured the sentiment of the conflict with this insightful comment: 
“the boom of activity in the planet's underworld has brought to the surface 
not only an abundance of hydrocarbons, but a deep reservoir of buried 
political and social tension.” 55 
The pace and extent of the Front Range hydraulic fracturing boom 
alarmed many communities leading to passage of local government 
moratoria, bans on hydraulic fracturing, and proposed ballot measures 
restricting the use of hydraulic fracturing statewide.56  The local 
government bans and moratoria were eventually found to be invalid and 
unenforceable by the Colorado Supreme Court.57  Shortly thereafter, there 
were referendum attempts to place measures on the Colorado ballot that 
would restrict hydraulic fracturing statewide.58  One of the proposed ballot 
measures would have prohibited oil and gas facilities from operating 
within 2,500 feet of homes or other occupied buildings, and another would 
have given more power to local governments to restrict fracking.59  Both 
proposals failed for lack of sufficient signatures.60  Despite the setbacks, 
                                                 
55. Limerick, supra note 52. In her article The fractured terrain of oil 
and gas opposition, Patty Limerick notes that this division into “two clearly defined 
and rigidly opposed cohorts” does not take into account the layers of complexity 
involved in the Front Range hydraulic fracturing debate. Limerick, supra note 52.  
That complexity comes from a number of sources including: (1) the “inaudible 
population” that represents the middle, (2) the factors of class, race and ethnicity that 
“converge in second concealed layer”, (3) a recognition that companies come in all 
different sizes and include principal players and subcontractors, (4) and that the term 
“opponents” can include everyone from a neighboring resident to an oil and gas 
wellsite to national environmental activists. Id.  
56. See Shaffer et al., supra note 53, at 70 (hereinafter Shaffer). 
57. City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016) 
(the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Fort Collin’s five-year moratorium on 
fracking and storage of fracking waste within the city to be  preempted by state law 
and therefore invalid and unenforceable); City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas, 
369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016) (The Colorado Supreme Court found the City of 
Longmont’s ban on fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking wastes within its 
city limits to be preempted by state law and therefore invalid and unenforceable).  
58. Mark K. Matthew & Joey Bunch, Colorado Anti-Fracking 
Measures Fail to Make Ballot; Possible Forgery Alleged, Denv. Post, Aug. 29, 2016.  
59. Id.  
60. Id.  
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Front Range communities have continued to pass short-term moratoriums 
while they consider new regulations.61  
 In the midst of the ongoing conflict, oil and gas operators continue 
to drill in and adjacent to expanding communities along the Front Range.  
Many of those companies, wary of the “deep reservoir of buried political 
and social tension,”62 initiated efforts to achieve a social license from the 
Front Range communities in which they operate.  One of the tools used by 
the oil and gas companies to achieve a social license along the Front Range 
is the development of MOUs with impacted communities.63  
One of the first such efforts was an MOU between Erie, Colorado, 
and two oil and gas companies developing in and around Erie.64  At the 
time the MOU was negotiated, Erie had in place a drilling moratorium 
suspending oil and gas development within its jurisdiction until studies on 
air quality were conducted and the town could develop a method to work 
with oil and gas companies.65  During the moratorium, the town of Erie 
and the two oil and gas companies negotiated and signed an MOU.66  The 
signed MOU requires the oil and gas companies to attach a list of best 
practices, negotiated with Erie, to their drilling permits submitted to the 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.67  After the MOU was 
signed, Erie lifted its moratorium and oil and gas activity in the area 
resumed.68  
In this instance, the two oil and gas companies were able to 
successfully achieve a social license through the process of negotiating 
and implementing an MOU that required them to employ community-
negotiated best practices.  The grant of a social license from the 
community resulted in the drilling moratorium being lifted with almost 
                                                 
61. The Associated Press, Lafayette Warned Against Oil, Gas Drilling 
Moratorium, The Denv. Post, Sept. 30, 2017.  
62. Limerick, supra note 52.  
63. See  Univ. of Colorado, Database of MOUs, Oilandgasbmps.org, 
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/MOU-databases.php (last visited (April 18, 
2018). This database allows users to access the MOUs and to compare the best 
management practices contained within them. 
64. Shaffer, supra note 53, at 70.  
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
67. Id.  
68. Id.   
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non-existent public comment and criticism.69  In this case study, litigation 
that would eventually befall other Front Range communities who enacted 
drilling moratoriums and bans was avoided, reducing conflict and saving 
time and money.70  What we do not know is how collaborative the MOU 
negotiation process was.  It is not clear whether City of Erie officials 
engaged one-on-one with community members to develop the list of best 
practices that accompanied the MOU.  We can only surmise that city 
officials established sufficient levels of legitimacy, credibility, and trust 
among concerned Erie residents that not only earned the city a social 
license to negotiate on their behalf, but bestowed a social license to the oil 
and gas companies to operate.  
Researchers from the Colorado School of Mine’s Center for a 
Sustainable West have recently published two papers analyzing the impact 
of these types of MOUs on public opinion and citizen complaints.71  They 
found that MOUs can help shape community participation in the 
governance of oil and gas activity, namely by focusing community 
complaints to specific issues.72  This is likely because the MOU improves 
environmental performance, or there is at least a perception that it does.73  
The researchers also found that drilling encroachment was the strongest 
factor leading to complaints against oil and gas development.74  
Specifically, the proximity of wells to residential locations, not the rate of 
drilling activity, was the greatest predictor of the volume of complaints.75  
                                                 
69. Id. 
70. Id.  
71. See Skylar Zilliox & Jessica M. Smith, Supraregulatory 
Agreements and Unconventional Energy Development: Learning from Citizen 
Concerns, Enforceability and Participation in Colorado, 4 THE EXTRACTIVE INDUS. 
AND SOC’Y 69 (2017); Shaffer, supra note 53, at 69.  
72. Shaffer, supra note 53, at 84. 
73. Id.  
74. Id.  
75. Id. The Researchers at the Colorado School of Mines found that 
noise was the leading cause for complaint among those impacted by suburban oil and 
gas development. Id.  This led them to suggest that suburbanites affected by oil and 
gas activity are more interested in coexisting with industrial activity (i.e. they would 
like the noise to be reduced, but are agreeable with the other aspects of the activity). 
Id. This is in contrast to rural populations who have more strongly opposed oil and 
gas activity on the grounds that it changes people’s relationship with the land. Id. 
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Ultimately, they concluded that the MOUs provided an opportunity for 
energy companies and communities to reconcile their expectations, 
generate a learning process about the energy industry, and the MOUs 
provide a mechanism for energy companies to listen to the communities 
closest to their operations.76  In the researcher’s opinion, the link that the 
MOUs provide between the energy companies and communities “allows 
for oil and gas operations to run more smoothly, with complaints being 
pointed toward issues that are not already being addressed by oil and gas 
companies.”77 
This case study reveals that by engaging in a MOU negotiation 
process, both the oil and gas companies and the communities were able to 
gain more value than they would have without the process.  The value 
gained by the companies was the lifting of the community drilling 
moratorium, and the value gained by the communities was the 
implementation of negotiated best practices that reduced the impact to the 
community from the oil and gas development.  Neither parties’ added 
value would have been achieved but the MOU negotiation process.  
 
D. Federal Land Case Study: Nine Mile Canyon Case Study 
 
The second case study is derived from a Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Foundation article authored by University of Utah law professor 
Robert Keiter and his student Kirstin Lindstrom entitled, “Lessons from 
Nine Mile Canyon: Achieving Consensus over Energy Development on 
Public Lands.”78  In this article, Keiter and Lindstrom provide insight on a 
controversial oil and gas development project that took place on Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) land in Utah’s energy-rich Uinta Basin.79  
In 2004, the Bill Barrett Corporation (BBC) sought permission 
from the BLM to drill 807 new oil and gas wells on 53,250 acres of federal 
public land anticipating a recovery of one trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
                                                 
76. Id. at 85.  
77. Id.  
78. Robert B. Keiter & Kirstin Lindstrom, Lessons from Nine Mile 
Canyon: Achieving Consensus Over Energy Development on Public Lands, 57 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST., 3-1 (2011).  
79. Id.  
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over the life of the project.80  The majority of the drill sites were proposed 
to be located on the West Tavaputs Plateau with principal access to the 
drill sites via an improved road through Nine Mile Canyon.81  Activists 
opposed the project as it threatened Wilderness Study Areas on the West 
Tavaputs Plateau, significant Native American rock art sites, and other 
cultural resources in the Nine Mile Canyon.82  
Given the array and significance of economic, cultural, and 
environmental resources found in the Nine Mile Canyon-West Tavaputs 
Plateau region, numerous stakeholders were interested in the BLM’s final 
decision.83  The groups that had formally submitted comments on the 
proposed action included the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
(SUWA), the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP), several 
Native American tribes, other environmental and cultural groups, the State 
of Utah, and local government officials.84  
Because the proposed project was located on federal public land, 
NEPA was triggered, requiring the BLM to prepare an EIS to assess the 
impacts associated with the project.85  As part of the EIS process, the BLM 
is required to provide the public with an opportunity to comment on the 
proposed development.86  Because of the concern over cultural and 
wilderness resources, the BLM and BBC encountered “substantial 
                                                 
80. Id. at 3-9.   
81. Id. (Prior to development, the Nine Mile Canyon road consisted of 
an unpaved dirt track. Id. at 3-8.).   
82. Id. at 3-7 to 3-8 (Nine Mile Canyon is renowned for its Native 
American cultural resources including rock art, granaries, and other ancient objects. 
West Tavaputs Plateau contains several wilderness study areas (WSA) that are legally 
protected under FLPMA. Id.  Activists were concerned that the proposed project—
and the road traffic and dust it would generate—could irreparably harm the rock art 
sites in the Canyon. Id. Further, they were concerned that the development of new 
roads and drill sites on the Tavaputs Plateau would compromise the wilderness 
characteristics in the WSAs located there. Id.  The initial proposal contemplated 
twenty well pads in designated WSAs and 218 well pads on lands with wilderness 
character. Id.). 
83. Id. at 3-6. 
84. Id. at 3-10. 
85. Id. at 3-6. 
86. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2017) (federal agencies are required to request 
comments from the public after preparing a draft environmental impact statement).  
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opposition” to the drilling proposal.87  The project also triggered the 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).88  The NHPA implementing 
regulations require federal agencies to determine whether proposed 
projects cause any “adverse effects” and if so, initiate formal consultation 
with interested parties.89  
Out of concern for damage to cultural resources in Nine Mile 
Canyon, NTHP, SUWA and others concerned about the proposed project 
petitioned the BLM to be granted formal consultation party status under 
NHPA § 106.90  After initially denying the request, the BLM eventually 
agreed to initiate a formal consultation process, invited a number of parties 
and employed a formal mediator to facilitate the meetings.91  Keiter and 
Lindstrom describe the formal NHPA § 106 consultation process as a 
transparent collaboration process that allows the parties to meet face-to-
face with government officials to share their knowledge and concerns.92  
The process included opportunities for site visits to examine the damaged 
rock art, making the problem less abstract and distant.93  According to 
Keiter and Lindstrom, “the process helped the parties become better 
acquainted with one another and each other’s concerns, encouraged them 
to ignore their ideological differences, and enabled them to begin building 
some mutual trust.”94  After a year-long process, the parties reached a 
programmatic agreement to protect the cultural resources in Nine Mile 
Canyon while allowing the natural gas project to proceed.95  The 
agreement requires the parties to meet annually, includes provisions to 
address actions to be taken in the event of adverse impact to the rock art 
and a dispute resolution section.96  
                                                 
87. Keiter, supra note 78, at 3-6.  
88. Id. at 3-6.   
89. Id.  
90. Id. at 3-11.  
91. Id. at 3-12. 
92. Id. at 3-13.  
93. Id.  
94. Id.  
95. Id. (Under the agreement, Bill Barrett Corporation's financial 
contributions were significant and included: funds for a Cultural Resource Monitoring 
Plan, new visitor interpretation sites, curation costs, cultural resource training for its 
personnel, and a consultant to research the potential impacts of dust on rock art.)  
96. Id. at 3-14. 
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Despite an agreement addressing the concerns with Nine Mile 
Canyon, BBC still faced  significant opposition to its proposal to drill West 
Tavaputs Plateau.97  Having achieved success with the NHPA § 106 
negotiations, BBC agreed to initiate private bilateral negotiations with 
SUWA, the main environmental group opposing development on the 
plateau.98  After a six-month bilateral negotiation, BBC and SUWA 
reached a two-party agreement.99  In order to protect wilderness qualities, 
BBC agreed to significantly scale back its development proposal and to 
utilize new directional drilling technologies that would enable it to drill 
from consolidated well pads.100  
Because the BLM retained final decision authority over the 
project, BBC and SUWA presented their agreement to the BLM.101  
Further, because a draft EIS had already been issued, it was too late to 
include the terms of the agreement in the draft.102  However, the BLM 
found that the original range of alternatives considered in the draft EIS 
were broad enough to accommodate inclusion of the terms of the 
agreement into the final EIS.103  The BLM incorporated most of the terms 
of the agreement into its final EIS and Record of Decision.104  
Simultaneously, the BBC and SUWA met with other stakeholders and 
urged them to support the agreement, which they ultimately did.105  
Keiter and Lindstrom offer the following lessons learned from 
BBC and SUWA Nine Mile Canyon and West Tavaputs Plateau 
negotiations: 
 
                                                 
97. Id. at 3-17 – 3-18. 
98. Id. at 3-18.  
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 3-20. (The reductions agreed to by the BBC included a 66% 
reduction in the total operations area and an 88% reduction in new well pads. Id.)  
101. Id. at 3-19. (The authors noted that the fact that the BLM was not 
part of the BBC-SUWA negotiation process actually facilitated the agreement because 
the parties were able to establish a “mutually trusting relationship and to address the 
issues candidly between themselves.” Id.) 
102. Id. at 3-20.  
103. Id. at 20. 
104. Id. at 3-20.  
105. Id. at 3-19.  
 
 PUBLIC LANDS & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW  Vol.39 
 
 
 
222 
● The NHPA § 106 requirements provided the framework 
for convening a multi-party collaboration process that 
resulted in a mutually agreeable agreement that both 
protected natural resources and allowed the natural gas 
development to proceed.106  The structured NHPA § 106 
process enabled parties to get to know one another, and 
thus, facilitated understanding and enabled the parties to 
overcome longstanding strained ideological differences 
and strained relationships.107 
● The project proponent’s willingness to undertake and pay 
for the recommended mitigation measures helped the 
parties arrive at a solution.108  
● A NEPA EIS process that only accepts public comment 
through a one-way comment process, and does not 
include face-to-face negotiations in a structured setting, 
would not have assisted the parties in reaching this 
agreement.109  The private bilateral negotiation model 
should be an available dispute resolution option pursued 
within the NEPA framework.110 
● While it is easier to engage in a bilateral negotiation 
without the BLM present, the agency must be included at 
some point given its “legal responsibility for the broader 
public interest.”111  
● To accommodate negotiated agreements between 
stakeholders, federal land managers should ensure NEPA 
documents include a broad range of alternatives. This is 
important for two reasons: (1) it ensures the agency has 
flexibility to incorporate agreements into its decision 
without having to issue a new draft EIS; and (2) it 
provides the structure from which parties can negotiate to 
                                                 
106. Id. at 3-15.  
107. Id. at 3-16. 
108. Id.  
109. Id. at 3-15.  
110. Id. at 3-22.  
111. Id. at 3-21.  
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resolve their disputes without overstepping their limited 
role in the formal decision-making process.112  
● The negotiating parties must be prepared to convince 
other nonparticipating parties to support the agreement as 
well as garner support from the federal agency decision-
maker.113  
● The BBC-SUWA agreement was a compromise, neither 
achieved its goal, but the parties were able to protect their 
interests and walked away with a more trusting 
relationship while creating more value than if they had not 
worked together.114  
 
This case study exemplifies that both a formal NHPA § 106 
collaborative process and private bilateral agreements can assist an oil and 
gas developer to achieve a social license to operate on federal public lands 
and can add value to all parties.  In this instance, the added value to the 
BBC was reduction in opposition to the project that likely would have 
resulted in costly delays and litigation. The added value to the groups 
opposing the project included a reduction in the overall scope of the 
project and protection of critical resources.  Neither parties added value 
would be achieved if the collaborative process and the bilateral agreement 
leading to the social license to operate had not been attempted.  
 
III.  THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL LICENSE IS ESSENTIALLY A 
COLLABORATIVE PROCESS 
 
There is no uniform approach to obtaining a social license because 
circumstances vary among development projects, geography, community 
characteristics and industry dependence, and stakeholder values and 
                                                 
112. Id. at 3-22 to 3-23. The authors explain that federal land managers 
should regard the drafting of NEPA alternatives as a potential tool for fostering 
dialogue, setting the parameters for inner-party negotiations, and promoting 
expeditious decision making by reducing the likelihood of post-negotiation NEPA 
delays.” Id. at 3-23.  
113. Id. at 3-23.  
114. Id.  
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concerns.115  However, social license “ingredients” and guidelines have 
been identified and developed by researchers and trade associations that 
define elements and processes that have several common 
characteristics.116  Notably, Denver University Law Professor Don Smith 
and Western State Colorado University co-author Jessica Richards have 
summarized the trade association guidelines, extracting the common 
factors or “ingredients” needed to obtain a social license.117  
Among the social license ingredients identified by Smith and 
Richards, are elements critical to the support of meaningful dialogue 
around serious, potentially divisive issues. These elements include: trust, 
open communication, transparency, and accountability.118  Building trust 
is arguably the essential social license ingredient.119  Trust has been 
defined as “a common belief among a group of individuals that another 
group (1) will make good faith-efforts to behave in accordance with any 
commitments both explicit and implicit,” (2) will “be honest in whatever 
negotiations preceded such commitments,” and (3) will “not take 
excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available.”120   
Trust is achieved through open communication and community 
engagement. Community engagement is a two-way process of both giving 
and receiving information, which can take place through a number of 
channels from one-on-one communications with individual community 
                                                 
115. Smith, Richards, & Colwell, supra note 24, at 14-8.  
116. See IPIECA, Oil and Gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary 
Sustainability Reporting – 2010 Update, Jan. 2011, IPIECA.org, http://www.ipieca.o
rg/publication/oil-and-gas-industry-guidancevoluntary-sustainability-reporting-2010-
update (last visited January 17, 2018); Jason Prno and D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring 
the Origins of “Social License to Operate” in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from 
Governance and Sustainability Theories, 37(3) RES. POL’Y, 346, 348-349 (2012).  
117. Smith & Richards, supra note 46 at 111-133.  
118. Id. at 112-121. 
119. Id. at 112.  
120. Ann Thomson and James Perry, Collaboration Processes: Inside 
the Black Box, PUB. ADMIN. REV., 20, 22 (Dec. 2016) (citing L.L. Cummings and 
Philip Bromiley, THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST INVENTORY 303 (Roderick 
M. Kramer and Tom R. Ryler (1996)).  
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stakeholders to public meetings and forums.121  Transparency on the part 
of an industry seeking social license requires full disclosure of steps being 
taken to minimize risks, acknowledgment of challenges and failures, and 
disclosure of clearly defined steps to continually improve operations.122  A 
company is accountable if it provides a clear signal to affected 
communities that attainment and maintenance of a social license is a top 
priority, such as ensuring adherence to social license principles through its 
compensation of executives, managers, employees, and subcontractors.123  
Other researchers link social license to trust and legitimacy.  As 
Gehman et. al. cite in their paper on legitimacy in social license, two of 
the pioneering researchers on this topic, Susan Joyce and Ian Thompson, 
included in their definition of social license to operate three normative 
components: legitimacy, credibility and trust.124  Joyce and Thompson 
define legitimacy as conforming to established legal, social, and cultural 
norms, both formal and informal.125  They define credibility as “the quality 
of being believed—the capacity or power to elicit belief” and trust is the 
“willingness to be vulnerable to risk or loss through the actions of 
another.”126  Joyce and Thompson differentiate between project 
acceptance and approval, arguing that legitimacy is necessary for 
acceptance, but credibility and trust are necessary for approval.127 
                                                 
121.       Am. Petroleum Inst., Community Engagement Guidelines, ANSI/
API 1003 First Edition, (July 2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/files/policy/explora
tion/100-3_e1.pdf.  (last viewed January 17, 2018).  
122. Smith & Richards “Social License to Operate," supra note 46, at 
118 (citing Extracting the Facts: An Investor Guide to Disclosing Risks from 
Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and 
Investor Environmental Health Network 3, http://iehn.org/documents/frackguidance.
pdf (2011)). 
123. Id. at 120–121.  
124. JOEL GEHMAN, LIANNE M. LEFSRUD, AND STEWART FAST, SOCIAL 
LICENSE TO OPERATE: LEGITIMACY BY ANOTHER NAME?, 60(2) Canadian Public 
Administration, 293, 295 (2017).   
125. Ian Thomson and Susan Joyce, The Social License to Operate: 
What is it And Why Does it Seem So Difficult to Obtain? Presentation to the 
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention (Mar. 2008), 
available at http://www.oncommonground.ca/wp/downloads/PDAC_2008_Social_L
icence.pdf.  
126. Id.  
127. Id. 
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Smith and Richards also identify a number of procedural elements 
that contribute to social license, including methods for identifying 
stakeholders, broadening decision-making procedures, and establishing 
agreements and grievance procedures.128  A stakeholder can be broadly 
defined as  “[a]ny person, group or entity that has interest or concern in an 
organization and its activities.”129  However, the typical context of social 
license is project-based, hence a more operable definition of a stakeholder 
is a person, group or entity that will be affected by a project or has a strong 
interest in it.130  With respect to how stakeholders interact with companies, 
we can further refine the definition of stakeholders as “individuals acting 
both in their roles as citizens and as formal representatives of collective[ly] 
interested and affected parties.”131  
In a conventional approach to oil and gas project planning and 
development, the company is a unitary decision-maker that proposes a 
development plan publically and then defends it against opposition.132  
This approach has done little to help companies achieve a social license. 
Instead, Smith and Richards suggest broadening decision-making 
procedures and establishing agreements with communities by involving 
the community early in the project’s design phase.133  Involving the 
community early on provides a voice to community concerns and 
community ownership, which in turn contributes toward the achievement 
of a social license by the company.134  There are many ways to broaden 
decision-making procedures, but at a minimum, views of stakeholders 
must reach corporate decision-makers in a well-defined way and must be 
                                                 
128. Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 121–125. 
129. Am. Petroleum Inst., supra note 121, at vi.  
130. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Science Advisory Board, 
Improved Science-Based Environmental Stakeholder Processes, EPA-SAB-EC-
COM-01-006), Yosemite.epa.gov, https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/42E 
4E3AF4DC15AB4852578650059DE8F/$File/eecm01006_report_appna-e.pdf (this 
definition is extrapolated from a discussion of stakeholder definition on pp. 6-7). 
131. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 15 (Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern eds., 2008).  
132. Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 123.  
133. Id.  123–124.  
134. Id. 123–124 (citing Jim Kent & Kevin Preister, Surging Industries 
in Global Energy: Creating a New Era in Community Engagement, RIGHT OF WAY 
(July/Aug. 2013)). 
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taken into consideration.135  Community involvement in company 
decisions may also extend to a company’s grievance procedures. The 
establishment of community-based grievance mechanism or grievance 
procedure is a process, wholly or partially run by a company, that resolves 
community concerns or grievances.136  
At its core, social license to operate involves a significant degree 
of meaningful dialogue between the firm and the community in the 
planning and operation of the industrial activity.  Dialogue in this context 
is face-to-face interaction with multiple stakeholders that encourages long-
term relationships between industry and affected communities, and where 
the firm and affected stakeholders resolve their opposing interests in order 
to achieve their respective goals.  This interaction with stakeholders is the 
essence of collaboration.  An often-cited definition of collaboration is, “a 
process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can 
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go 
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.”137  Constructive 
exploration of differences between the firm and stakeholders creates the 
environment for the firm to establish the legitimacy, credibility, and trust 
necessary to obtain a social license to operate. 
There is a rich and extensive literature on collaboration which is 
variously defined and described as, among other labels, collaborative 
problem solving, collaborative decision-making, collaborative 
governance, environmental conflict resolution, alternative dispute 
resolution, consensus building, and co-management. Collaboration as we 
define it here “involves informal but structured face-to-face interaction 
among representatives of stakeholder groups who hold different 
viewpoints.  The goals are to promote early participation by the affected 
stakeholders; produce sensible and stable policies or decisions that have a 
strong, broad base of support; and reduce the likelihood of subsequent 
disagreements or legal challenges.”138  
                                                 
135. Id. at 123.  
136. Id. at 122–123.  
137. BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND 
FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 5 (1998). 
138. PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 10 (Rosemary O'Leary, and Lisa Bingham eds., 2003).  
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Collaborative processes are differentiated from other forms of 
public involvement in the interaction’s intensity, convening officials’ 
goals, and stakeholders’ implicit authority.  The International Association 
of Public Participation (IAP2) places collaboration among a spectrum of 
public participation methods.139  The public participation spectrum goes 
from least to most intense, moving from merely informing, to consulting, 
to involving, to collaborating, and finally, to empowering.140  For example, 
the public participation goal of consulting is to “obtain public feedback on 
analysis, alternatives, and/or decisions.”141  In this mode, officials preserve 
their authority and power but commit themselves to receiving input from 
participants. The stated purpose of most public hearings and many other 
public meetings is to provide such advice.142  
In contrast to less intensive forms of public involvement, the goal 
of collaboration according to IAP2, is to “partner with the public in each 
aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the 
identification of the preferred solution.”143  Collaborative processes are 
typically used to foster dialogue, clarify areas of agreement and 
disagreement, improve the information on which a decision is based, and 
resolve controversial issues in ways that all interests find acceptable.144  
They typically involve stakeholders in a mode of aggregating their 
preferences and bargaining to achieve their interests. In this mode, 
stakeholders know what they want, and the mode of decision-making 
aggregates their preferences — often mediated by the influence and power 
that they bring — into a social choice.145  The exploration of interests and 
give-and-take of bargaining allows participants to find the best available 
options to advance their joint preferences.146 
                                                 
139. Int’l Ass’n of Pub. Participation, IAP2 Spectrum of Public 
Participation, C.cymcdn.com, https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/ 
resmgr/files/iap-006_brochure_a3_internat.pdf.  
140. Id.  
141. Id.  
142. Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance, 
66(s1) PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 69 (2006).  
143. Id.  
144. PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, supra note 138, at 10. 
145. Fung, supra note 142, at 68. 
146. Id.  
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Collaborative processes are founded on principled engagement, a 
term that is drawn from the work of Fisher and Ury in their classic book, 
Getting to Yes.147  Principled engagement “means the use of processes that 
uphold core tenets of effective engagement.  Included among these tenets 
are fair and civil discourse and open and inclusive communication that are 
informed by the perspectives and knowledge of all participants.  
Moreover, effective engagement typically requires balanced 
representation from all relevant and significant interests.”148 
Collaboration consists of processes and techniques that enable 
parties to jointly identify the issues to be resolved and reach agreement on 
a solution.149  Practitioners and researchers generally agree on a set of 
principles or characteristics that collaborative processes share.150  These 
are namely: 
 
1. Participation is voluntary,151 and participants and 
sponsors are committed to participate in good faith with 
an open mindset to new perspectives.152 
2. Parties must be able to participate directly, be willing to 
use this strategy, and be able to select their own 
representatives.153 
3. All participants are fully informed of the purpose and 
objectives of the process, are engaged in defining and 
enforcing process protocols and ground rules, and seek 
agreement on how to share, test, and apply relevant 
information.154 
                                                 
147. ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2011).  
148. KIRK EMERSON AND TINA NABATCHI, COLLABORATIVE 
GOVERNANCE REGIMES 59 (2015).   
149. Getting to Yes, supra note 147, at 15.  
150. PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, supra note 139, at 6. 
151. Id.  
152. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING, supra note 131, at 24. 
153. Id.  
154. Id.  
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4. Communication is open and accurate. Parties must be able 
to engage in full, open, and truthful exchange.155 
5. Parties must realize that they are interdependent.  At the 
same time, any and all participants must have the option 
to withdraw and seek a resolution through other means.156 
6. Parties must agree to the outcome of the process157 and 
commit to the implementation of agreements.158  
 
A typical collaborative process has three, well-defined stages, 
each containing a number of steps, tasks, or objectives.159  In the pre-
deliberation stage a sponsor or convener raises the possibility of 
collaboration and initiates the process. Before convening the parties, there 
is usually an attempt to assess the issues and identify potentially affected 
parties.  Such an assessment helps the sponsor or convener develop a 
strategy for bringing the parties together and managing the collaborative 
process.  
During the deliberation stage, parties gather and share information 
about the issues to be deliberated, and agree on methods for generating 
answers to relevant technical questions, or a path to follow, even if no 
technical consensus exists.  They identify and share interests—reasons, 
needs, concerns, and motivations underlying participants' positions—
rather than assert positions.  Through the sharing of information and 
concerns, they converge on and define the problems to be resolved through 
their deliberations.  Once the parties have clearly articulated the issues that 
need to be resolved and identified all parties’ interests at the table, the next 
step is to find solutions that resolve the issues and satisfy the interests.  In 
                                                 
155. HOWARD RAIFFA, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART 
OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING, 83 (2002).  
156. PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, supra note 139, at 6. 
157. Id.  
158. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING, supra note 131, at 24. 
159. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE 
IMPASSE, CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987) 
(outlining three major stages of the negotiation process including: pre-negotiation, 
negotiation, and post-negotiation. Id.  Here, the term "negotiation" has been softened 
somewhat and reframed as "deliberation" in order to generalize to a range of 
collaborative decision-making processes.). 
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this stage, they work to brainstorm options that have the potential satisfy 
the interests of all parties.  Using objective criteria to evaluate the options, 
parties converge on a set options or pathways that resolve the issues that 
divide them and reach an agreement on how to move forward. 
The post-deliberation phase ensures implementation of the 
agreement.  Areas of agreement are documented to ensure a common 
understanding of the participants' accord.  At this stage the parties also 
ratify the agreement with their constituents.  Parties garner support for the 
agreement from interest groups they represent as well as organizations that 
have a role in carrying it out.  Each party follows its own internal 
procedures as it reviews and adopts the agreement or plan. 
 Firms that wish to operate in communities and landscapes where 
their actions are viewed negatively and their motives as illegitimate and 
untrustworthy may be best served by collaborating with community 
members and other affected parties.  By initiating and sustaining a 
collaborative process that adheres to foundational principles and best 
practices, companies have the opportunity to produce operational 
decisions that have a strong, broad base of support, and can reduce the 
likelihood of subsequent disagreements or legal challenges. In other 
words, they can achieve a social license to operate. 
 
IV.  NEPA: A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE 
COLLABORATION TO ACHIEVE A SOCIAL LICENSE ON PUBLIC 
LAND OIL AND GAS PROJECTS 
 
Despite the opportunity to add value, social license to operate has 
seldom been utilized in federal public land oil and gas development 
projects.  We speculate that this is because oil and gas operators perceive 
the legal license to operate on federal public lands, particularly compliance 
with NEPA, to equate to a social license to operate.  In fact, this is more 
than a speculation.  This point arose during our 2015 Energy & 
Collaboration Summit with energy executives in Jackson, Wyoming.160  
During that conversation, executives from oil and gas companies indicated 
that many federal land energy operators perceive compliance with the 
                                                 
160. Energy & Collaboration Summit, Jackson, Wyoming (Mar. 6, 
2014) (unpublished conference report) (on file with the author).  
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NEPA process as inhibiting collaboration and preventing companies from 
going beyond compliance in order to work directly with affected 
communities and stakeholders to achieve a social license to operate.161  
Citing the increased opposition to federal public land oil and gas projects, 
the participants indicated that engaging in a well-defined and structured 
collaborative process to achieve a social license offered greater value to 
the company than just complying with the required legal license processes 
(particularly NEPA).162 
Contrary to the Summit participants’ perception, we argue that 
NEPA is not a barrier to greater incorporation of collaborative processes 
to achieve a social license.  After a review of NEPA itself, the Council of 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA regulations, agency specific NEPA 
regulations and guidance, case law, and other potential federal agency 
procedural discretionary limits, we conclude that the NEPA process 
actually provides a unique opportunity to incorporate collaboration into 
federal public land oil and gas development projects in order to achieve a 
social license to operate.  That unique opportunity exists because unlike 
development on private land, the legal license requirements of compliance 
with NEPA provides oil and gas companies with a defined structure from 
which to engage communities and stakeholders through a collaborative 
process in order to achieve a social license to operate.  
 
A.  The NEPA Process Explained163 
 
At the heart of NEPA is a mandate to all federal agencies to 
prepare a “detailed statement” for every “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”164  This 
“detailed statement” must include: the environmental impact of the 
                                                 
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Portions of this section were originally published by the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation in the manual of the Special Institute on the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 2017.  See Temple Stoellinger, “Having Your 
Voice Heard: How to Effectively Get the Agency’s Attention in a NEPA Comment to 
Affect the Final Decision,” National Environmental Policy Act 9-1, ROCKY MT. MIN. 
L. FDN. (2017).  
164. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018).   
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proposed action, adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided, 
alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship between short-term 
uses of the environment and long-term productivity, and any irreversible 
and irretrievable commitments of resources.165  Prior to preparing a 
“detailed statement,” the federal agency must consult with and obtain 
comments from “any Federal agency that has jurisdiction by law or special 
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.”166 
To find more specificity on the NEPA process, we must turn to 
the CEQ NEPA regulations. CEQ, established through NEPA,167 was 
directed in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter to promulgate NEPA 
implementing regulations, binding on all agencies.168  Those regulations, 
found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508, were promulgated to inform federal 
agencies of what they must do to comply with the NEPA procedures.169   
The regulations require federal agencies to “identify and assess the 
reasonable alternatives to a proposed action that will avoid or minimize 
adverse effects of these action upon the quality of the human 
environment.”170  Specifically, the CEQ regulations provide specific 
directions on when and how to prepare the NEPA required “detailed 
statement,” renamed in the CEQ regulations as an environmental impact 
                                                 
165. Id. § 4332(c)(i)-(v).    
166. Id. § 4332(c). 
167. Id. § 4342. 
168. Relating to Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality, 
Exec. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (May 24, 1977) (The Executive 
order directed the CEQ to issue regulations to Federal agencies that implemented the 
procedural provisions of NEPA. Id. Penn State University Law Professor Jamison 
Colburn has pointed to the fact that NEPA says nothing about CEQ enacting rules, 
instead the rules were enacted at the direction of President Jimmy Carter. Jamison E. 
Colburn, Administering the National Environmental Policy Act, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10287 (Apr. 2015) (referencing Exec Order No 11991).  Meaning, it is not NEPA 
itself, but rather the president’s “constitutional powers that ground the very NEPA 
rules forming the basis of contemporary NEPA law.” Id.  Professor Colburn notes that 
NEPA’s real goals “are no less than the remaking of American into a sustainable 
civilization” but it was the CEQ regulations that transformed NEPA into a procedural 
statute and set those procedures into law. Id.  He suggests that had a pre-enforcement 
review petition on assertion of authority been viable, the conclusion might have been 
that CEQ had no power of its own to administer NEPA. Id. at 10296.).  
169. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2017). 
170. Id. § 1500.2. 
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statement (EIS).171  Most oil and gas projects on federal public lands are 
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment,”172 and therefore, the federal agency tasked with approving 
the project must prepare an EIS.173  EISs are prepared in the following 
stages: scoping, draft, final, and the agency’s decision documented in a 
Record of Decision (ROD).  
The first stage of an EIS is known as “scoping.”174  Scope is 
defined as “the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered 
in an environmental impact statement.”175  During scoping, federal 
agencies are required to identify and invite participation of “[a]ffected 
Federal, State, and local agencies, any affected Indian tribe, the proponent 
of the action, and other interested persons.”176  The agency may hold 
public meetings during the scoping process, but is not required to do so.177  
The scoping process is initiated when the agency files a notice of intent in 
the Federal Register.178  The notice of intent must include: a description of 
the proposed action and possible alternatives, describe the agency’s 
proposed scoping process including whether, when, and where any 
scoping meetings will be held, and include contact information for a 
person in the agency who can answer questions about the proposed action 
and EIS.179 
The next step in the NEPA process is the completion of a draft 
EIS.180  According to CEQ regulations, draft EISs “shall be prepared in 
accordance with the scope decided upon in the scoping process” and 
should include all of the analysis and information required to be contained 
in a final EIS.181  Draft EISs “shall provide full and fair discussion of 
                                                 
171. Id. §§ 1502.1–1502.25.  
172. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018).  
173. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.11, 1501.4(e). 
174. Id. § 1508.25.   
175. Id. (The definition of scope also includes a list of actions, 
alternatives and impacts an agency can consider to determine the scope. Id.) 
176. Id. § 1501.7(a)(1) (emphasis added) (While interested persons is 
not defined, we can assume it means interested members of the public. Id.).  
177. Id. § 1501.7(b)(4).  
178. Id. § 1501.7. 
179. Id. § 1508.22 (definition of a notice of intent). 
180. Id. § 1502.9.   
181. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (2017). 
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significant environmental impacts and shall inform the public of the 
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts 
or enhance the quality of the human environment.”182  Once a draft EIS is 
completed, a federal agency must request the comments of state and local 
agencies, Indian tribes, other federal agencies, the project applicant (if 
any), and the public.183  Specifically, the agency must “affirmatively solicit 
comments from those persons or organizations who may be interested or 
affected.”184  To accomplish the requirement, agencies must publish a 
Notice of Availability (NOA) in the Federal Register, informing the public 
that the draft is available and public comment on the draft is being 
accepted.185  The public is then provided a minimum of 45 days to submit 
comments on the draft EIS.186 
Agencies must respond to comments received on the draft EIS and 
to “any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in 
the draft statement and shall indicate the agency’s response to the issues 
raised.”187  Once the final EIS is completed, the agency must circulate the 
final in the same manner as it did the draft EIS.188  Although agencies do 
not have to request comments on a final EIS, they may choose to do so.189  
It is important to note that the final EIS is not the final agency decision.190  
Instead, the final agency decision is rendered in a “record of decision” or 
ROD, which is prepared and signed after the agency issues the final EIS.191  
In a ROD, agencies must state their decision regarding the proposed 
                                                 
182. Id. § 1502.1 (offering the purpose of an environmental impact 
statements.  The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement, as prescribed 
in the regulation, is to “serve as an action forcing decision to ensure that the policies 
and goals defined in the Act [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and 
actions of the Federal Government.” Id.). 
183. Id. § 1503.1(a). 
184. Id. § 1503.1(a)(4). 
185. Id. § 1506.10(a).  
186. Id. § 1506.10(c) (allowing for extending and reducing the comment 
period. Id.). 
187. Id. § 1502.9(b). 
188. Id. § 1502.19. 
189. Id. § 1503.1(b). 
190. Id. § 1505.2.  
191. Id. (requiring that at the time of its decision, agencies are required 
to “prepare a concise public record of the decision.” Id.). 
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action, identify all alternatives considered in reaching the decision, and 
state whether all practical means to avoid or minimize environmental harm 
were adopted.192  When discussing the alternatives considered, the agency 
must discuss the factors relevant to its decision, including economic and 
technical considerations and the agency’s statutory mission.193  
 
B.  A Procedural Floor, Not a Procedural Ceiling 
 
Procedural statutes like NEPA establish the procedural floor 
rather than the procedural ceiling and “typically leave agencies free to 
experiment with procedures that elaborate upon the statutory 
minimum.”194  As long as an agency is not violating a provision of NEPA, 
how they implement the statute is up to the agency’s discretion.  
While the CEQ regulations do include specific requirements to 
seek public comment during specific touch points in the NEPA process, 
nothing in NEPA itself or the CEQ regulations preclude a federal agency 
from including more public involvement through collaboration during the 
NEPA process.  Rather than providing a barrier, the requirement in CEQ 
regulation § 506.6 to “make diligent efforts to involve the public in 
preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures”195 and to “solicit 
appropriate information from the public,”196 arguably offers authority for 
federal agencies to incorporate more public involvement, including 
collaborative processes to achieve a social license.  
In addition to considering the procedural floor established in 
NEPA and the CEQ regulations, we must also consider any procedural 
limitations the agencies implementing NEPA may have included for 
themselves.  Two federal agencies that would be in a position to prepare 
an oil and gas NEPA document are the BLM and the United States Forest 
Service (Forest Service).  Far from setting any procedural limits, the BLM 
and Forest Service specifically revised their NEPA regulations in 2008 to 
expressly include the opportunity to incorporate more collaboration into 
                                                 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Emily S. Bremer and Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in 
Vermont Yankee’s White Space, 32 J. OF LAND USE & ENVT’L LAW, 523, 535 (2017).  
195. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a) (2017) (emphasis added).   
196. Id. § 1506.6(d). 
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their NEPA processes.197  The BLM did so by including the following 
statement in its regulation on EIS content: “responsible official may 
collaborate with those persons or organizations that may be interested or 
affected to modify a proposed action and alternatives(s) under 
consideration prior to issuing a draft environmental impact statement.”  
Similarly, but more subtlety, the Forest Service did so by including its 
revised regulation on EIS content that a “responsible official may modify 
the proposed action and alternative(s) under consideration prior to issuing 
a draft EIS.”198 
 
C.  Incorporating Collaboration Into the NEPA Process 
 
 In October 2007, the President’s Council on Environmental 
Quality issued a handbook for NEPA practitioners on collaboration in 
NEPA.199  The CEQ handbook identifies many opportunities for 
collaboration with interested stakeholders throughout a NEPA process. 
The handbook provides advice for how to collaborate across the different 
phases of the NEPA process including identification of the proposed 
action and its purpose and need, scoping, development of alternatives and 
a preferred alternative, identification of the affected environment and 
environmental consequences, and implementation and monitoring of the 
ROD.200  The only NEPA-related activities not open to collaboration are 
                                                 
197. See Forest Service National Environmental Policy Act Procedures 
Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,084 (July 24, 2008) (The Forest Service NEPA regulations 
were revised in 20087 to “provide an environmental analysis process that better fits 
with modern thinking on decision making, collaboration, and adaptive management 
by describing a process for incremental alternative development and development of 
adaptive management alternatives.”); Department of the Interior Implementation of 
the NEPA Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 126 (Jan. 2, 2008) 
(The DOI NEPA regulations were revised in part in 2008 to “allow for better 
integration of NEPA procedures and documentation into current Departmental 
decision-making processes, including collaboration and incremental decision-
making.” Id.). 
198. 36 C.F.R. § 220.5(e)(1) (2018).   
199. Collaboration in NEPA: A Handbook for NEPA Practitioners, 
Council on Environmental Quality (2007) http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ 
CEQ_Collaboration_in_NEPA_10-2007.pdf. 
200. Id.  
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the final decision-making and issuance of the ROD or Finding of No 
Significant Impact for which a federal agency alone is responsible.201   
 Federal agencies, including the Forest Service and BLM, have 
been exploring ways to make NEPA processes more equitable, effective, 
and efficient by incorporating collaborative approaches.202  As noted 
above, both the BLM and the Forest Service revised their NEPA 
regulations in 2008 to clarify that NEPA alternatives may be modified 
through an incremental process.203  The revised language in both agencies’ 
NEPA regulations was intended to support efforts to include incremental 
changes to alternatives that are generated through collaboration.204   
Incorporating incremental changes into an EIS as the agency collaborates 
with various stakeholders during the NEPA process is known as iterative 
NEPA (iNEPA).  iNEPA since it allows federal agencies to iteratively 
develop alternatives that meet as many stakeholder interests as possible.205  
We argue that the BLM and/or Forest Service can utilize an 
iNEPA approach to incorporate stakeholder and community collaboration 
into the NEPA process in order to achieve a social license to operate for 
oil and gas developments on federal public land.  
 
D.  Application of iNEPA 
 
 The traditional approach to EIS development has generally been 
to inform and take feedback from the public during the scoping and draft 
document stages.  In its environmental analysis, the agency outlines a 
series of potential alternative actions, including the “no action” alternative, 
analyzes each action in detail, and selects one alternative as the basis for 
its decision.206  Here, public engagement consists of a presentation of the 
purpose and need, already formulated by the agency, and a following draft 
                                                 
201. Id. at 4. 
202.       Jessica  M. Clement,   Iterative    NEPA    and    Collaboration,     
Proceedings of the iNEPA Workshop, 5 (Feb. 10-11, 2014), (http://www. 
uwyo.edu/haub/_files/_docs/ruckelshaus/pubs/2015-inepa-report.pdf. 
203. Forest Service National Environmental Policy Act Procedures 
Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,084 (July 24, 2008); Dept. of the Interior Implementation 
of the NEPA Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 126 (Jan. 2, 
2008). 
204. Iterative NEPA and Collaboration, supra note 202, at 7.  
205. Id. at 6.   
206. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1(e) (2017).  
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document, to which the public can only respond, not engage.  Because of 
this, the agency will often find itself dealing with serious distrust at best 
and extended court challenges at worst.   
Rather than an agency merely taking public input and trying to 
balance interests in a series of alternatives, most of which will be discarded 
anyway, it can be more efficient for the agency to work with the public on 
a continuous basis to meet as many interests as possible.  During this 
process, alternatives are created by all interests that outline location of oil 
and gas infrastructure, measures to mitigate or avoid impacts, monitoring 
methods, and other pertinent aspects of the operation.  By engaging in a 
learning process where stakeholders identify the potential opportunities 
and problems related to the proposed project, and finding solutions for 
mutual gain that form the agency’s (and the public’s) preferred alternative, 
the agency and the project proponent can begin the process of establishing 
the legitimacy, credibility, and trust necessary for achieving a social 
license.   
There are two approaches that an agency can take to include the 
public collaboratively in oil and gas decisions.  The first is to engage 
stakeholders in advance of publishing the Notice of Intent and initiating 
the NEPA process.  Such informal or “pre-NEPA” collaboration allows 
the agency to explore the purpose and need for the proposed project with 
stakeholders and generate alternatives that meet their interests.  The 
potential outcome of pre-NEPA collaboration is that stakeholders can help 
to define the range of alternatives that are incorporated and analyzed in the 
draft environmental statement, and even help to define the preferred 
alternative prior to the development of the draft EIS.   
The second approach is to formally build collaboration into the 
NEPA process through iNEPA in which the agency works with all 
interests in a systematic way, from conceptualizing the proposed action 
through generating the final NEPA document.  iNEPA encourages 
agencies to adapt and modify proposals and alternatives by iteratively 
developing them with the public.207  While agencies are not required to 
incorporate collaboration into their iNEPA processes, iNEPA lends itself 
to being combined with an integrated and collaborative approach.  It 
allows agencies to develop an EIS with stakeholders that includes a 
                                                 
207. Id. at 6. 
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preferred alternative that has been developed collaboratively.208  iNEPA is 
particularly applicable when the federal action triggering NEPA is both 
complex and contentious.  In that instance, a collaborative approach that 
creates efficiency and trust will provide the most benefit to the agency, a 
project proponent, and stakeholders. 
 Efficiencies are created by iteratively working with the public to 
create alternatives that contain the ideas, knowledge, and buy-in of as 
many interests as possible.209  NEPA documents often are created to meet 
legal requirements and generate management alternatives that staff can 
handle.210  But if public engagement is reduced to the minimum required 
under CEQ regulations and the process is perceived to be in opposition to 
what many interests want, the document may wind up being challenged 
anyway.211  The iNEPA approach allows agencies to be proactive and 
systematically include public deliberation into the planning process.  
Collaborating with the public and iteratively developing a preferred 
alternative that meets stakeholders’ interests reduces the amount of time 
that would be required to analyze a series of alternatives that would not be 
used anyway.  Additionally, including the public in meaningful 
deliberation and learning increases trust in the agency and ultimately 
social license into both the agency’s actions and documentation.212 
It is eminently feasible for an agency and a proponent to work with 
the public to find solutions in a more efficient and inclusive manner under 
NEPA.  Given an agency decision maker and staff who understand the 
opportunities iNEPA and other inclusive approaches provide, and the 
expertise on board to convene and guide a public process to the creation 
of alternatives that meet as many interests as possible, there is no reason 
not to start a project using this approach.  An energy company could 
benefit from the creation of social license using iNEPA and can work with 
an agency to implement this approach. 
                                                 
208. Id.  
209. Id. at 11.  
210. Marc J. Stern et. al., From the Office to the Field: Areas of Tension 
and Consensus in the Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act 
Within the US Forest Service, 91 J. OF ENVT’L MGMT, 1350, 1351 (2010). 
211. Id.   
212. Jessica Western (Clement) & Michele Straube, iNEPA, the iPhone 
of Environmental Impact Review, Makes NEPA more User-Friendly, 30 A.B.A. SEC. 
OF THE ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., 41, (2015).  
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E.  Using iNEPA to Foster Collaboration to Achieve a Social License to 
Operate 
 
 There are a few examples of how federal agencies have used 
iNEPA to iteratively and collaboratively meet as many interests as 
possible through a NEPA process. Examples include: the expansion of 
snowmobiling in California, the building of a large parking garage in 
Michigan, and the large-landscape scale restoration of aspen stands in 
Utah.213  A more energy-specific example of iNEPA application that 
resulted in the achievement of a social license took place on the 
Uncompahgre Plateau in Colorado.214  During the development of the 
Uncompahgre Plateau Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration 
Project, the Forest Service and its constituents needed to find a way to fund 
the restoration of mule deer habitat in fire-suppressed ponderosa pine 
stands.215  Among the public, the Forest Service found a great deal of 
support for biomass utilization as a way to fund restoration and support 
the local economy.216  However, there were some interest groups that were 
concerned that conducting treatments to allow a biomass utilization 
operation to be financially viable would lead to more treatments than were 
necessary to restore the forest.217  This polarization of opinions lead the 
Forest Service to explore how they might develop a social license to 
operate to use forest biomass for energy development.218  
The Forest Service used an iterative and collaborative approach to 
reduce scientific uncertainty and to quantitatively identify the level of 
social acceptance for biomass harvesting and utilization.219  While the 
collaborative approach took two years, once completed it enabled the 
                                                 
213. Iterative NEPA and Collaboration, supra note 202, at 14–16.  
214. Jessica M. Western et. al., Examining the Social Acceptability of 
Forest Biomass Harvesting and Utilization From Collaborative Forest Landscape 
Restoration: A Case Study From Western Colorado, USA, J. OF FORESTRY (115 ed.) 
6, 530 (2017).  
215. Id. at 532.   
216. Id. at 533.  
217. Id. at 535.  
218. Id. at 537. 
219. Id. at 538.  
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Forest Service to quickly and without objection, develop an 
Environmental Assessment in six months.220  Using an iterative and 
collaborative approach, the agency managed to fulfill the need to restore 
the forest, improve wildlife habitat for mule deer, create a predictable 
supply of biomass with which a company could start building its 
operations, and create more jobs in the community.221  By using this 
approach, the agency achieved a social license to operate and created far 
more value than just restoring a forest.222  
Despite the existence of the iNEPA option, federal personnel often 
cling to their fear (or comfort)223 of adopting new approaches. Agency fear 
of utilizing their discretionary authority was discussed by J.B. Ruhl and 
Kyle Robisch in their recent article entitled “Agencies Running From 
Agency Discretion".224  In the article, they note that while discretion has 
been defined as the “root source of administrative agency power and 
influence,” agencies have been reluctant to run with discretion and have 
instead run from it.225  They suggest that agencies run from their 
discretionary authority because of the “process baggage” or decision 
making prerequisites that comes with exercising discretion in the modern 
administrative state.226  The effect of process baggage not only has an 
“ossification” effect on federal agency use of discretionary decision 
making authority, it has also led agencies to claim a lack of discretionary 
authority.227  
 So why are federal agencies running from their discretionary 
authority to incorporate more collaboration into the NEPA process?  In a 
2013 master’s thesis, Colorado State Journalism and Technical 
Communication student Peggy Cochran Roberts addressed that very 
                                                 
220. Id. at 531.  
221. Id. 
222. In this instance it was the Forest Service desiring and achieving the 
social license, but in an oil and gas context it will be the project proponent, not the 
federal agency seeking the social license.  
223. Stern, supra note 210, at 1351.  
224. J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency 
Discretion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV., 97, 102 (2016). 
225. Id.  
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 102–103. 
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point.228  In her thesis, Roberts assessed the acceptance or rejection federal 
agency staff had toward implementing collaborative public participation 
techniques and explored the factors that either encouraged or discouraged 
their willingness to adopt collaboration techniques into NEPA decision-
making processes.229  The factors she identified that contribute to agency 
staff willingness to adopt collaborative public participation techniques 
included: meeting regulatory requirements, agency culture, agency 
commitment, and the ability to measure success.230  The factors identified 
that discouraged implementation of collaborative techniques included: 
lack of staff education about collaboration techniques, cost, schedule, staff 
availability, and staff experience.231 
In addition to the factors Roberts identified, there are other factors 
to take into consideration.  External to the agency, staff have experienced 
how some parties do not participate in collaboration and instead “wait in 
the wings” to file critical comments and/or litigate.232  In other situations, 
because an agency did not use collaborative approaches, diverse interests 
worked together to design a consensus-derived alternative, only to find it 
rejected by the agency which increased frustration and lack of trust.233   
Finally, extensive evidence exists that within the agency, decision makers 
and line officers often disqualify the quality of input from the public and 
object to collaborative approaches, thereby incurring opportunity costs 
and missing chances to find mutually agreed common sense solutions.234 
As the collaborative process that leads to a social license to 
operate will be most beneficial to the oil and gas operator, what can 
operators do to encourage agencies to utilize an iNEPA approach?  First, 
operators should become familiar with iNEPA and collaboration 
themselves.  Second, the operator should advocate for agencies to use the 
iNEPA approach. Third, operators can assist the agencies in bolstering the 
                                                 
228. Peggy Cochran Roberts, Factors Influencing Agency Staff’s 
Willingness to Adopt Collaborative Public Participation Techniques in the NEPA 
Decision-Making Process 1 (2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Colorado State 
University), available at https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/
81075/Roberts_colostate_ 0053N_12088.pdf. 
229. Id. at 3. 
230. Id. at 26.  
231. Id.  
232. Id. at 33–34.  
233. Western and Straube, supra note 212, at 41. 
234. Id. at 41; Stern, supra note 210, at 1355. 
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capacity of stakeholders to participate in an iNEPA process by supporting 
outreach, training, information, blogs, and face-to-face opportunities can 
all be used to enhance this capacity.  Finally, as the cost of collaborative 
approaches is sometimes considered a hindering factor, the company can 
agree to pay for the costs associated with the collaborative effort, including 
if necessary, costs of a trained facilitator to run the process.  
 
V.  THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, THE 
ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
 
Despite the flexibility contained in NEPA, the CEQ NEPA 
regulations, and the agency’s NEPA regulations (particularly the new 
iNEPA regulations) to incorporate public collaboration into NEPA 
processes in order to achieve a social license, there is a substantial federal 
legal limit to agency’s ability to do so: The Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA).235  
FACA, passed in 1972 during the “good government” initiative of 
the 1970’s, governs agency solicitation of policy advice from outside 
groups236 and is intended to ensure that citizen involvement in federal 
decisions is equitable and that individuals or groups do not have undue 
influence.237  Whenever a federal agency intends to “establish, control, or 
management a group that has at least one member who is not a federal, 
tribal, state or local government employee” the agency must comply with 
FACA.238  Compliance with FACA requires the federal agency to establish 
                                                 
235. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012).  
236. Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory 
Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG., 451, 452-53 (1997) 
(explaining that FACA was passed “in part out of concern that some interests had 
come to enjoy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive 
decisionmakers.”) 
237. U.S. Forest Serv., Key Principles and Practical Advice for 
Complying with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, (Nov. 2, 2011), Fs.usda.gov, 
https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5203270.pdf.  
238. U.S. BLM, Bureau of Land Management National Policy for the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act: What BLM Staff Need to Know When Working with 
ADR-Based Collaborative Community Working Groups, 1 (May 2005) Ntc.blm.gov, 
https://www.ntc.blm.gov/krc/uploads/880/BLM%20Field%20Guide%20-
%20Federal%20Advisory%20Committee%20Act%20-%202005-05-01.pdf.  
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a federal advisory committee (FAC), a lengthy and time consuming 
process.239 A FAC is defined as:  
 
any committee, board, commission, council, panel, task 
force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or 
other subgroup thereof …, which is  
(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, 
or  
(B) established or utilized by the President, or  
(C) established or utilized by one or more 
agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or 
recommendations for the President or one or more 
agencies or officers of the Federal Government . . .240  
 
 There are three apparent components to an advisory committee: 
(1) FACA only applies to a group (not individuals), (2) groups subject to 
the Act must be established by statute or utilized by the President or a 
federal agency, and (3) established groups must be utilized for the purpose 
                                                 
239. Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil 
and Gas Development: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 36 ENVT. L. 
REP., 10962, 10970 (2009) (explaining that it took two years for a federal advisory 
committee to be approved for the Pinedale Anticline Working Group, and by that time, 
the group had lost both its momentum and its ability to keep pace with the oil and gas 
development for which they were tasked with monitoring and making adaptive 
management recommendations).  
240. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (2012). In addition to complying with the 
requirements in FACA itself, Executive Order 12,838 further instructs federal 
agencies to reduce their reliance upon advisory committees by up to a third and to only 
create new advisory committees if “compelling considerations” so require. 
Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees, Exec. Order No. 
12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 12, 1993).  Further, Executive Order 12,838’s 
implementing directive, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-135, 
“Management of Federal Advisory Committees,” instructs federal agencies to cap the 
number of advisory committees that each agency is allowed to maintain. U.S. O.M.B., 
Circular No. A-135, Management of Federal Advisory Committees (Oct. 5, 1994), 
Whitehouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a135. The BLM has 
also promulgated regulations instructing the formation and implementation of FACs. 
43 C.F.R. §§ 1784.0-1 to 1784.6-2.   
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of providing “advice or recommendations” to the President or an agency.  
Once established, FACA requires that FACs:241  
 
● establish a written charter that explains the mission of the 
committee;242    
● give timely notice of the committee meeting in the Federal 
Register;243  
● have fair and balanced membership on the committee;244   
● open committee meetings to the public, whenever 
possible;245  
● have the sponsoring agency prepare minutes of the 
committee meetings;246   
● provide public access to the information used by the 
committee;247  
● grant the federal government the authority to convene and 
adjourn the meetings;248 and 
● terminate within two years unless the committee is 
renewed or otherwise provided for by statute.249  
 
In their article “Chilling Collaboration: the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental 
                                                 
241. This list is reproduced from one contained in the following: 
Thomas C. Beierle & Rebecca J. Long, Chilling Collaboration: The Federal Advisory 
Committee Act and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decisionmaking, 29 
ENVT. L. REP., 10,399, 10,402 (1999).  
242           U.S. General Services Administration, Federal Advisory Commi
ttee Charters (2017), available at: https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/ 
federal-advisory-committee-management/advice-and-guidance/federal-advisory-
committee-charters (each advisory committee prepares and files a formal charter, 
accessible at https://www.facadatabase.gov, before the agency can meet or take any 
action).  
243. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2). 
244. Id. at § 5(c). 
245. Id. at § 10(a)(1). 
246. Id. at § 10(c). 
247. Id. at § 5.  
248. Id. at § 10(f). 
249. Id. at §14(b). 
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Decisionmaking”, Thomas C. Beierle and Rebecca J. Long discuss that 
while FACA’s requirements appear innocuous, they actually directly and 
indirectly discourage the use of collaborative processes and have become 
a significant barrier to stakeholder efforts.250  Beierle and Long offer three 
chilling effects FACA has on collaborative decision making: (1) the “law’s 
procedural barriers that deter public groups from forming FACA-charter 
committees;” (2) “administrative requirements that discourage agencies 
from establishing FACA chartered committees;” and (3) “ambiguity about 
the law’s requirements that creates fear among agencies of any type of 
collaboration, or even consultation, with entities not chartered under 
FACA.”251  Discouragingly, they note that “taken together, these elements 
mean that, on the one hand, agencies and the public are discouraged from 
chartering advisory committees under FACA, while, on the other hand, 
government personnel are reluctant to collaborate or meet with 
stakeholders unless they are chartered as a FACA committee.”252  They 
suggest that while “FACA-phobia” has its origins in law, it is also a 
behavioral phenomenon within agencies who have become too fearful of 
FACA and should be encouraged to be more bold.253  Their rationale for 
suggesting this is that punishment for violating FACA has not been that 
bad.254  Moreover, if agencies comply with the spirit and intent of FACA 
by conducting open and fair processes, there are likely no interests willing 
to bring a suit against the agency on FACA grounds.255  Further, even if  
aggrieved parties bring a suit, agencies are more likely to receive a 
favorable ruling by the courts because of the process used.256 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
250. Beierle & Long, supra note 241, at 10,403.  
251. Id. 10,402–405.  
252. Id. 10,403. 
253. Id. at 10,410.  
254. Id.  
255. Id.   
256. Id. referencing Steven P. Croley, Practical Guidance on the 
Applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U., 111, 
176 (1996). 
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A.  FACA Safe Cooperation; Four Options 
 
An agency's ability to incorporate collaboration in the NEPA 
process is certainly limited by FACA.257  In seeking to increase 
collaboration through a NEPA process, a federal agency cannot convene a 
group of stakeholders seeking to solicit their advice and recommendations 
without considering FACA’s requirements.  However, FACA does not 
prohibit agencies from collaborating.258  Federal agencies can still include 
more collaboration into their NEPA processes (iNEPA or traditional) 
while still complying with FACA.259  In an effort to encourage BLM 
employees to be less FACA-phobic, the BLM published a document in 
May 2005 entitled “Bureau of Land Management National Policy the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act: What BLM Staff Need to Know When 
Working with ADR-Based Collaborative Community Working 
Groups.”260  In the document they acknowledge that when FACA was 
signed into law, collaborative community working groups were clearly not 
contemplated as these types of groups are a relatively new development in 
agency efforts.261  While noting that collaborative efforts may likely 
trigger FACA, the guidance suggests that collaborative efforts can be 
designed and used in ways that do not trigger FACA.262 
In fact, there are four ways to include collaboration into a NEPA 
process to achieve a social license to operate while maintaining 
compliance with FACA: (1) create a FAC in accordance with  FACA and 
other applicable regulations; (2) convene open meetings where no 
collective advice or recommendations are offered by a group (individuals 
advice or recommendations are ok); (3) limit participation of a group to 
government entities only; or (4) have a non-federal organization convene 
and administer the consensus seeking group, with the federal agency 
participating as a fellow stakeholder in a technical resource capacity while 
retaining their federal decision-making capacity.263   
                                                 
257. Benson, supra note 239, at 10970. 
258. Iterative NEPA and Collaboration, supra note 202, at 12.  
259. Id. 
260. U.S. BLM, supra note 238.  
261. Id. at 1-2.  
262. Id. at 2.  
263. Id. at 13.  
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The major limitation of the first option is federal agency’s 
reluctance given the onerous rules involved with compliance with FACA.  
In her article “Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas 
Development: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform,” Melinda 
Harm Benson discusses FACA as an obstacle to public involvement and 
adaptive management efforts related to federal public land oil and gas 
development projects.264  She provides an example suing the Pinedale 
Anticline Working Group, a group of stakeholders tasked under the 
Pinedale Anticline Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Project 
Record of Decision, responsible for assisting the BLM in establishing and 
implementing an adaptive management for the Pinedale Anticline.265  The 
group waited two years for the establishment of a FAC and in the wait lost 
its momentum and its ability to keep pace with the oil and gas 
development.266  Benson notes that “while enacted with the best intentions, 
FACA has actually paved the way for restricted public involvement” 
because “the reality is that within federal agencies, FACA’s requirements 
are viewed as onerous, and fear of running afoul of FACA’s requirements 
is often used as an excuse to avoid engaging those outside government.”267  
She references a 1998 Government Accountability Office survey of 
federal agencies that found many instances where federal agencies decided 
not to obtain outside input because of fear of compliance with FACA.268  
It is also important to point out that even if a FAC is requested 
there is no guarantee it will be approved by agency officials as the total 
number of FACs are limited. Executive Order 12,838, signed by President 
Clinton in 1993, instructs federal agencies to reduce their reliance upon 
advisory committees by up to a third and to create new advisory 
committees only if “compelling considerations” so require.269  
Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget’s implementation of 
                                                 
264. Benson, supra note 239, at 10,970.  
265. Id.  
266. Id. at 10,967, 10,970. 
267. Id. at 10,970.  
268. Id. (citing U.S. GAO, Federal Advisory Committee Act: Views of 
Committee Members and Agencies on Federal Advisory Committee Issues 5 (July 9, 
1998)).  
269. Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees, 
Exec. Order No. 12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 12, 1993).  
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the Executive Order instructs federal agencies to cap the number of 
advisory committees that each agency is allowed to maintain.270  
While the requirements of FACA may make it too difficult in 
some instances for federal agencies to form a FAC, that is likely not the 
case in all instances.  This is particularly true for major oil and gas projects 
where the volume of oil and gas resources measured against the 
environmental and social issues to overcome compel the use of a 
formalized collaborative process to achieve a social license.  In those 
instances, the time and effort required to initiate a FAC may be worth the 
effort.  The bottom line under option one is: if a federal agency chooses to 
create an official FAC in order to incorporate stakeholder collaboration 
into a NEPA process, it should be a strategic decision made well in 
advance to secure sufficient time to officially establish and charter the 
FAC. 
Under the second option, a federal agency can convene a 
collaborative process by hosting a series of meetings that are open to all.271  
At the meetings, issues, interests, options, and final solutions are 
deliberated with the agency so long as the group does not render specific 
advice or recommendations to the agency as a group, whether by 
consensus majority or otherwise.272  Instead, to avoid triggering FACA, 
the group should provide only information, while individual members of 
that group can provide specific recommendations and advice.273  Under 
this option, meetings should be well publicized and membership remain 
open to all.  
The third option involves the federal agency convening a 
collaborative group, limiting members of the group to government 
                                                 
270. OMB, Circular No. A-135, Management of Federal Advisory 
Committees (Oct. 5, 1994), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars
_a135. It has been suggested that Exec. Order 12,838 may, in fact, be in tension with 
the goal to promote more consensus-based decision-making, as any consensus-based 
decision-making initiatives may well trigger FACA and therefore require the creation 
of an advisory committee. Croley & Funk, supra note 236.  This tension has been 
described as classic tension of government involving “principals favoring openness, 
participation, and accountability, on one hand, and those favoring administrative 
speed, efficiency, and sure-footedness, on the other.” Id. 
271. U.S. BLM, supra note 238, at 4. 
272. Id.  
273. Id.  
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officials only.  If the collaborative group includes participants that are 
solely federal, tribal, state and local government employees operating in 
their official capacities, then the group is exempt from the requirements of 
FACA.274  
The final option is to have a non-federal organization convene and 
organize the consensus seeking group, with the federal agency 
participating as a fellow stakeholder while retaining their federal decision-
making capacity.  The non-federal convener could be the operator, as long 
as a third-party neutral designs and leads the collaborative process.  The 
key point here is that the federal agency must not establish, manage, or 
control the group; instead, the agency’s role should be limited to that of a 
group participant.275  
In conclusion, while FACA is a significant limitation on an 
agency’s procedural discretionary authority to incorporate more 
collaboration into the NEPA process toward achieving a social license, 
agencies are not without options.  Agencies can either strategically comply 
with the requirements of FACA if appropriate, or they can avoid the 
burdens of FACA by convening non-advice offering groups, hosting 
collaborative groups of government officials only, or by having a third-
party organization convene and organize a collaborative consensus 
seeking group.  Ultimately, the benefits obtained by achieving a social 
license, specifically reducing the likelihood of litigation-drive delay, 
outweigh the burdens of complying with FACA.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In recognition that oil and gas projects go undeveloped “not for 
lack of a legal license, but for lack of growing, earning and maintaining a 
social license,”276 U.S. oil and gas companies are increasingly employing 
social license efforts.  Unfortunately, those efforts have not been as readily 
applied to oil and gas projects located on federal public lands.  In order to 
                                                 
274. Id. at 3.  
275. Id. at 4.  
276. Smith & Richards, supra note 46, at 117, citing an article including 
an audio interview with Alex Hohmann, Stakeholder Relations Manager for Anadarko 
Petroleum. Stephanie Joyce, Relationships 101: Oil and Gas Looks for a 
Social License to Operate, InsideEnergy.org, https://insideenergy.org/2014/12/05/ 
relationships-101-oil-and-gas-look-for-a-social-license- to-operate/ (Dec. 5, 2014). 
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reduce conflict and avoid costly delays associated with litigation of public 
land oil and gas development projects, oil and gas operators should employ 
efforts to obtain a social license from the communities adjacent to the 
development and from other stakeholders. 
As demonstrated, achieving a social license to operate, which 
involves a significant degree of meaningful dialogue between the energy 
company and the community, is in essence a collaborative process.  By 
encouraging federal agencies to capitalize on recent efforts to include 
more collaboration into the NEPA process (specifically through the 
iterative NEPA or iNEPA), oil and gas companies can use the NEPA 
process to achieve a social license to operate.  In doing so, oil and gas 
companies and agency personnel should be aware of the limitations 
incorporating more collaboration into the NEPA process imposed by 
FACA.  However, the FACA limitations are not insurmountable, and we 
have offered four options to incorporate more collaboration into the NEPA 
process that are “FACA safe.” 
Suggesting that federal agencies incorporate more collaboration 
into the NEPA process in order to enable project proponents to achieve a 
social license is certainly not limited to oil and gas operators.  It is 
applicable to all federal land project proponents who anticipate 
community and/or stakeholder opposition to their projects including coal, 
renewables, and timber.  By encouraging federal agencies to incorporate 
more collaboration into a NEPA process, federal land project proponents 
can utilize the legal license process to achieve a social license to operate.  
